The reality is that the establishment of a Jewish homeland in the area of the British Mandate was agreed upon in 1922 by the international community through the League of Nations. That this was 17 years before World War II started and was 23 years before the full extent of the Holocaust was known, demonstrates how chronologically challenged this contention is. Yet this does not address the underlying implication that in 1947, when the United Nations voted on Resolution 181 and the partition of Israel into a Jewish and Arab state, that the Jews were "given" a state because of European guilt regarding the Holocaust.
A recent translation by David Aisner of, “Hama’avak al Eretz-Yisrael” (“Struggle for Palestine”), by Shmuel Dotan (Published by Israel’s Ministry of Defense, 1973. 7th Edition 1988) uses primary source material to definitively prove that this linkage did not exist at the time that the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) made the recommendations that led to UN Resolution 181. Here is an excerpt from pp 370-1:
The UN decision [of November 29th 1947] provided international sanction to the idea of a Jewish state and aided in the complete victory of the Jewish people in that endeavor. The decision encouraged the Yishuv (Jewish settlement) to remain strong in the face of an impending war, and spared her from having to wage a long struggle with Britain. It was a victory of at least one, perhaps two elements of the Zionist information campaign to influence the UN – “need” and “ability”.
Proponents of partition generally believed that it was within their power to prevent a bloodbath in Palestine and save the small developed Jewish Yishuv from the hands of an underdeveloped and hostile Arab majority. They were convinced that the small Jewish state would provide a haven for a few hundred thousand displaced Jews, thereby solving the “Jewish problem”. The Jewish demand for recognition of Jewish historical rights to Palestine was not authorized in the decision; the results of this refusal on the part of the UN will surface in future UN-Israel relations, especially after 1967. The UN also refused to adopt the Zionist claim that there is a permanent link between the “Jewish problem” around the world and the Palestine question. To the contrary, it turns out that the Holocaust of European Jews had very little influence on the members of the UN, and was almost never mentioned during deliberations on the Palestine question, save for the representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland, whose primary motivation was their desire to distance Britain from Palestine.
Of course, the Holocaust provided an easier “climate” for the Zionist information campaign to try to influence the UN, but it did not succeed in influencing the considerations taken into account by UN statesmen. In the end, it was the Latin American block of the UN that was the overriding factor in securing the results of the UN vote of 1947. This UN block did not view itself responsible in anyway for the tragedy of Europe’s Jews. It seems then, that the extra emphasis found in literature regarding the supposed link between the Holocaust and the renewal of Jewish sovereignty in Palestine, is an attempt to create a myth and the results of that myth.
This attempt flows from the difficulties endured by the generation that witnessed the Holocaust, and that generation’s inability to examine this traumatic event in its entirety. This is especially the case when considering how that generation bore witness to the very weak condition of the Jewish people before and during the Holocaust and how difficult it was for that generation to then recognize that they now posses some measure of strength to be considered or reckoned with by other nations. Support for Zionist interests by the “world’s nations” after WWII has been naturally described, and with great exaggeration, as a type “compensation”. In truth, the Holocaust did not advance the Zionist cause, but rather it undermined one of its core philosophical arguments – its right to speak on behalf of Jewish millions who either wanted to or were being forced to leave their countries of origin due to anti-Semitism.
The Holocaust weakened the Jewish state which arose after termination of the British mandate and reinforced the Zionist decision to relinquish claims to a larger territory in order to save the Jewish people, since the vast majority of potential Jewish immigrants were murdered. The Jewish refugee question did not play a major role in the decision making process at the UN as thought by some researchers. The countries in which Jewish refugees were located and which sought to have them removed, were not members of the UN. The role of the United States in the UN vote has always been greatly exaggerated.
In 1947, the US had already been “entangled” in what was transpiring in Palestine and was subjected to internal political pressure from American Jewish groups influenced by the Yishuv’s struggle against the British. At the same time, a political vacuum formed in the international community due to a feeling of doubt as to whether or not the UN can actually resolve international issues of the day. Under these circumstances, UNSCOP took upon itself a far more decisive historic role than was intended with its inception. Among the considerations of whether or not to support UNSCOP’s recommendation, was the desire to stand behind a successful
international resolution that would strengthen the UN’s integrity.UNSCOP recommended partition, which under the circumstances of 1947 was a pro-Zionist solution, because it evaluated that Britain was failing in its ability to govern the region and also because it considered the Yishuv ripe for independence and that it would be wrong to place it under the rule of a hostile and underdeveloped Arab majority. The collaboration between the Arab leadership and Nazi Germany during WWII was also considered in the decision and proved to impact the Arab interest negatively. But this consideration was related specifically to WWII, not the Holocaust. The fact that Yugoslavia did not support the pro-Zionist plan, even though Haj-Amin Al-Husseini tried to enlist the Muslim minority there at the time to assist the Nazis, shed light on how difficult it was to try and link WWII to the Palestine question after the war.
The Jewish refugee issue did influence the United States, but primarily between 1945-1946 during the first winter after the war. It also influenced the Anglo-American committee after its visit to the displaced persons camps. Even so, the refugee situation was prevented from being used as a reason to adopt a clear pro-Zionist position to the point of recommending the rise of a Jewish state. UNSCOP was influenced very little by the Jewish refugee situation.
In the mean time, the refugee situation underwent significant changes. Many of the refugees scattered or left the displace persons camps to illegally immigrate to Palestine. In 1947, generally speaking, the camps were populated with new displaced persons, most of which were “escapees” from Eastern Europe. These refugees were in better physical condition and more resilient than their predecessors. UNSCOP was influenced by the illegal immigration phenomenon. But it was justly viewed by the committee (UNSCOP) first and foremost as a revelation of the Jewish struggle for independence, not as a derivative of the Holocaust. A number of witnesses claimed to UNSCOP, and very convincingly so, that illegal immigration to Palestine would have been even stronger if not for WWII or the Holocaust, because in their opinion there was no doubt that the distressful condition of Europe’s Jews in the 1930s would have only worsened in the 1940s even had the attempt to genocide or WWII not occurred.
Under these circumstances, it would seem that the reservoir of candidates to attempt illegal immigration to Palestine would have been far greater in number and in strength than what it was after the war. More than that, in 1947 the Holocaust was far less needed by the Zionist information campaign to make its case to the UN, than just one or two years prior. Conciseness of the Holocaust among the Jewish people and worry expressed by the “nations of the world” over the fate of the Jewish state will only arise in the 1960s. Even the Zionist push for statehood did not “need” the Holocaust. In fact, the push for statehood was sufficiently strong in 1937 and even more solidified in 1941, in essence before the Holocaust even began.