Amir Taheri, the Iranian born Middle East commentator has an article in this month's Commentary magazine sets his sights on the Iraq Study Group (ISG) and presents what he believes are the "real" or root problems of the Middle East.
Fifteen years ago, after the first defeat of Saddam Hussein and the liberation of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush and his Secretary of State James Baker faced the question of how best to exploit the American victory as a means of stabilizing the Middle East. The obvious course would have been to deploy the immensely enhanced prestige of the United States, backed by its unprecedented military presence in the Persian Gulf, to help create new and durable security structures in a region regarded as vital to American national interests.
How might this have been done? The U.S. could have urged its Arab allies to introduce long-overdue reforms as a step toward legitimizing their regimes and broadening their domestic political support. At the very least, the U.S. might have urged the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council to end their decades of intramural feuding and forge a broader alliance with Jordan and Egypt. This, with American support, might have helped create a new balance of power in the region to counter the ambitions of adventurist regimes like Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
But nothing of the sort was ever considered in Washington. Instead, as Baker declared in September 1991, the administration would go for “the big thing”: that is, finding a solution to the century-old conflict between the Jews and the Arabs. The result was the Madrid conference, an impressive show of heads of state but, as the decade’s subsequent events would prove, a wholly counterproductive exercise in peacemaking.
The two key analytical assumptions that led to Madrid were, first, that the Arab-Israeli conflict was the issue, the Ur-issue, of Middle Eastern politics and, second, that all the other issues in the region were inextricably linked to it. Despite everything that has happened in the interim to disprove these two assumptions, they still underlie the thinking of diplomats today. Most recently, they were repeated almost word for word in the long-awaited report of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) headed by the very same James Baker.
As Taheri rightly points out, this fixation on the Arab-Israeli conflict as the central or "Ur-issue" is a type of reductionism that borders on wish-fulfillment. Worse, it not only serves to divert attention from the very real internal problems that exist throughout this region, it privileges the discourse of those Arab elites who have made their careers by using the Arab-Israeli conflict to avoid much-needed introspection and reform. Moreover, the subtext to this approach is that it places the onus on the Israeli side, and is widely recognized as shorthand for "Israeli concessions". It presumes that an ever-shrinking Israel would suddenly bring peace and development to a region that British Prime Minister Blair has dubbed the "arc of crisis"
In this article, Taheri asserts that as pieces of former empires, none of the countries comprising this arc, "enjoys fully defined or internationally recognized borders" and then (quite didactically) goes about describing every contentious oasis or claim of suzerainty from Kashmir to Western Sahara. While it is certainly relevant to a more comprehensive understanding of the region that, "22 full-scale wars over territory and resources, not one of them having anything to do with Israel and the Palestinians" have been fought, in the end this is less than half of the story.
Taheri hints at irredentist claims in passing, but hardly does them justice. For example, the Kurds - which according to the Wikipedia article on them number some 35 million individuals - are mentioned only as part of a longstanding border dispute and cross-border guerrilla war between Turkey and Kurds in Northern Iraq. With all the attention focused on Israel's denial of "legitimate self-determination" to the Palestinians, one might be excused for not knowing that it is, "the Kurds [that] make up the largest ethnic group in the world who do not have a nation-state of their own." (See Wiki)
In the end, the solution that Taheri offers for the region is democratization as, "the only credible strategy ... and the only hope..." since,
"... with the exception of Israel and with the partial exception of Turkey, the entire Middle East lacks a culture of conflict resolution, let alone the necessary mechanisms of meaningful compromise. Such a culture can only be shaped through a process of democratization. Only democracies habitually resolve their conflicts through diplomacy rather than war, and only popular-based regimes possess the political strength and the moral will to build peace."
Taheri is certainly not the first or only one to promote this perspective. Condoleeza Rice and the Bush administration have made this point the primary thrust of their Middle East efforts. At her 2005 speech given at the American University in Cairo, Rice famously said, "For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East -- and we achieved neither" (to read the speech in its entirety). Thomas Friedman points out in his book, The World is Flat, that the difference beween an impoverished Muslim in India and an impoverished Muslim in Pakistan is that when the Indian Muslim sees the house of a rich person, he says to himself , "One day I will BE that man" whereas the Pakistani Muslim thinks, "One day I will KILL that man". According to this argument, India's secular democracy, provides young Muslims with equal opportunities and the means to have their voices heard. While this "solution" to the region's myriad problems is clearly well-meaning and even based on solid research that has shown that democracies do not go to war against each other, it flounders upon close scrutiny.
If the experiences of Algeria, Lebanon and Gaza are any indication of how "Democracy in the Middle East" would look, then it is clearly a subversive force that promises even greater instability and bloodshed. In a region characterized by the rifts of tribalism, that is lacking in a tradition of minority rights or tolerance for dissenting opinions (let alone mechanisms for power-sharing), this approach promises to be disastrous. Moreover, while I believe that every heart yearns to be free of tyranny and oppression, what struck me most about the above statement (besides its reductionism), is that it is a classic case of cultural imperialism to assume that Western democratic institutions are the solution to this region's woes. Besides, if we are to believe Taheri that the, "the entire Middle East lacks a culture of conflict resolution, let alone the necessary mechanisms of meaningful compromise", then any Democratic undertaking will necessarily be a top-down imposition.
As such, it is hard to see why "free and fair elections" in Iraq would prompt Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq to lay down their arms and embrace each other as brothers. I find it also highly unlikely and naive to think that democratization in the Middle East will lead to the acceptance of the State of Israel. Frankly, as Taheri points out in this article, Israel is in most ways peripheral to the pervasive and deep-seated problems that typify the region. Nonetheless, as history has repeatedly shown ... at the end of the day, it IS actually more convenient and easier to simply blame the Jews for all of your problems.
(To read the entire article click here.)